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Ethno-territorial Protest Movements and the Politics of 
Accommodation in Centralized and Decentralized Political Systems 
Christian Lammert 
  
  
ABSTRACT  
  
 The main purpose of the paper is  to  explain  the  divergent  paths  of development  of  
ethno-territorial  protest movements  in modern  democratic  political  systems. By 
focusing on the interaction between these movements and the state, the different systems 
of accommodation between the relevant regional and central elites will be analyzed. The 
study concentrates on the case studies of Québec (Canada) and Corsica (France). The 
paper is divided into three parts.  The first part  describes  the  traditional  systems  of  
accommodation  in  France  and Canada. The second part is focused on the process of 
socio-economic modernization in the 1950s  and  1960s  in  those  countries  that  
threatened  the  established  patterns  of  elite accommodation. The  third part deals with  
the consequences  for  the  established  patterns  of elite-accommodation and new 
concepts of territorial management that the central states tried to establish. By looking at 
the different degrees of centralization and decentralization in the mentioned political 
systems, the question of access to the political system by new social and political actors 
will be discussed in detail.  
                  
  
Introduction  
  
At least since the early 1960s ethno-territorial protest movements have 
increasingly challenged established patterns of political integration in western 
democracies. Great Britain, France, Spain or Canada, to name just a few examples, have 
all experienced such challenges. But it is not just the governments of these states who 
have to deal with this problem. It also poses a challenge to the social sciences, which 
have to explain the formation of these movements, and must also investigate the causes of 
the different paths of evolution the movements have taken. With regard to the latter 
aspect, and especially the nationalist movements in Corsica and Québec, we are presented 
with starkly dissimilar cases of conflict evolution. In the case of Corsica we can clearly 
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speak of a progressive radicalization of nationalist activities and a fragmentation 
of the nationalist movement, with some of the groups operating outside the legal bounds 
of the political system.1 The first signs of regional conflict articulation in Corsica became 
visible in the late 1950s, and can be described as a reaction against the central state policy 
of regional modernization in France.2 The subsequent radicalization of the movement can 
be described in different phases, and can be explained as a result of the interaction of the 
regional protest articulation and the response of the French state.3 High rates of terrorist 
activities and the participation of a variety of nationalist parties in the political system of 
Corsica are manifestations of this radicalization. Taking a different path, the nationalist 
movement in Québec has become highly integrated into the political system of the mainly 
francophone province, threatening the cohesion of the Canadian federation from inside 
the constitutional framework. In contrast to the fragmented Corsican movement, the 
nationalist forces in Québec are, at least since the founding of the Parti Québécois in 
1970, for the most part integrated into this party. This party has shown a high degree of 
internal coherence over the last 30 years.4 Two legal referendums for independence in 
1980 and 1995, and a strictly nationalist politics of the PQ in government, are the visible 
signs of the integration of the nationalist forces into the political system.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the factors and conditions of 
the different paths of conflict evolution. The argument is developed in three stages. First, 
a theoretical framework is developed that focuses on the concept of elite interaction as a 
pivotal factor for the evolution of nationalist movements. Second, traditional patterns of 
elite accommodation before the upsurge of regional and nationalist protest in Quebec and 
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Corsica are discussed, and the factors that threatened these systems are analyzed. Third, 
the evolution of the movements and the response of the respective states from the 1960s 
until today are investigated.             
 
Theoretical Framework 
  
  The (re)emergence of ethno-territorial protest movements in the 1960s has lead to 
a lively discussion in the social sciences. Until the mid 1960s, ethno-nationalism and 
ethno-nationalist movements had been largely ignored. Modernization theories treated 
ethnicity as a somewhat archaic phenomenon, which was alleged to disappear in the 
process of modernization.5 The political, social and economic conditions of 
modernization, it was assumed, required increasing standardization and homogenization. 
The main agents of change were to be the educational system and the media, along with 
the army. Additionally, national elites were to transform the culturally different parts of 
the population into one political community, sharing historical symbols, descent and 
national interests, regardless of social inequalities and class differences.6 
  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is safe to conclude that modernization did not 
work as smoothly or uniformly as these theoretical models suggested. The persistence 
and reemergence of ethno-territorial protest movements posed a challenge that could 
hardly be ignored. At first, the attempts to cope with these perplexing anomalies tried to 
incorporate regional protest into the framework of modernization theory. Arend Lijphart, 
in particular, approached the problem as part of the nation-building process itself: if the 
latter is advancing too fast, the danger of a defective form of integration and assimilation 
of some groups arises. Lijphart still presupposed the integrative effects of modernization, 
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but saw a disturbed transaction-integration balance as a base for ethnic conflicts. Lijphart 
wrote:  
  
In the first place modernization may have assimilative effects in the earlier  
stage of the development but not in later stages....Second, national assimilation  
is an extremely slow process. This means that social mobilization is  
conductive to assimilation but only up to a certain point: when mobilization is  
rapid, assimilation will lag behind.7 
    
A second type of approach has focused on the relationship between national minority 
movements and the process of socio-economic modernization. This approach depicts 
ethnic identities in opposition to the inescapable processes of modernization, as a revolt 
against modernity. As Seymour Lipset has written in this regard:  
  
The most dramatic form of resistance to modernizing trends in post-industrial  
society has been the re-emergence of ethnic or linguistic nationalism in many  
countries. These movements object to the centralization of power, economic  
strength, and cultural dominance in the majority regions of their country. They  
seek, either through gaining independence or autonomy, to control educational  
and cultural facilities and to build up the economy of their areas.8   
  
In this context ethnic identity is seen as a given, primordialist concept and defined as a 
counterweight to socio-economic modernization. Ethnicity, in effect, is conceptualized as 
a basic principle of social reality that sleeps under the surface of modern societies and 
that is awakened if modernization fails.   
  
  A third type of approach assumes a closer connection between the process of 
modernization and the emergence of ethno-territorial protest movements. Studies from 
this perspective focus mainly on the connection between the historical roots of identities 
and the current form of identity articulation. The objective is to better understand the 
conditions that will lead to a politicization of ethnic groups. As in the primordialist 
approaches, ethnic identities are conceptualized as a given factor. But in contrast to the 
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former the emphasis is on the causal factors that breed dissatisfaction and finally result in 
a rejection of established patterns of political integration. The conditions seen as the 
driving forces vary substantially in different models: in some cases uneven economic 
development is viewed as the main cause of mobilization.9 More generally, the cause is 
sometimes seen as simply the perception that a group or territory suffers from an unequal 
distribution or resources.10 Michael Hechter, for example, speaks of the cultural division 
of labour as the main source of ethnic conflict,11 whereas other authors explain regional 
protest with reference to sectoral differences in the process of modernization.12  Yet all 
approaches share the assumption that the key factors are part of the socio-economic 
situation of the analyzed group or territory as compared to the dominant society or to the 
core region of the state. Differences in economic growth rates, and in the pattern of 
political integration, result in a perception of inequality that can be interpreted in a 
cultural, political or economic sense.13    
  
But, as I have mentioned earlier, there are significant differences in the evolution 
of the nationalist movements in Corsica and France. Despite similar socio-economic 
environments the patterns of conflict evolution differ markedly in these two cases. This, I 
would argue, can neither be explained with reference to factors relating to the movement 
themselves nor with reference to differences in the center-periphery structure. We need to 
reach beyond the factors discussed above and, in particular, introduce a temporal 
dimension into the comparative framework. The approach presented in this paper is 
designed to take into consideration the interests, goals and priorities of the nationalist 
movements as well as the response of central state powers from this perspective. It 
attempts to link different approaches and to focus on the often-neglected interaction of 
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the policies of ethno-territorial movements and the central governments as they unfold 
over recurring feedback cycles.   
  
This approach is closer to the conceptual viewpoint of Paul Brass, who interprets 
ethnic identity as well as modern nationalism in large parts as a result of the interaction 
between the political elites of the central state and the elites of the respective non-
dominant ethnic groups, as determined by political and economic factors. Cultural norms 
and values of ethnic groups become  political resources in the conflict for political power 
and economic advantages.14 For Brass:  
  
Ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites in  
modernizing and in post-industrial societies undergoing dramatic social  
change. The process invariably involves competition and conflict for political  
power, economic benefits, and social status between competing elite, class,  
and leadership both within and among different ethnic categories.15 
  
The main question is concerned with the conditions of the conversion of cultural 
differences into a basis for political differentiation. The historical dimension of this 
evolution has to be taken into consideration. Central elements of this argument are, in 
particular, the traditional alliances between the respective elites who, in combination with 
the established institutional decision structures, set the framework for political action of 
the central elites vis-à-vis the ethno-territorial protest movement.   
  
  This theoretical approach seems to be open enough to account for the mentioned 
deviations in the evolution of the movements in Corsica and Québec, and may also help 
to explain why both movements did not come into existence before the 1960s. What kind 
of systems of elite accommodation guaranteed a stable political order before the 1960s, 
and what are the causes of the crisis of these successful systems in Canada and France? 
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To answer these questions this paper analyses the patterns of elite accommodation until 
the 1960s and the process of socio-economic modernization in both countries, and their 
consequences for the elite accommodation. The second part of the paper deals with the 
newly established political, economic, and societal elites and the following structures of 
elite accommodation in Canada and France. What happened to the old elites and how 
could the new elites integrate into the existing political orders?  
  
The interaction of political elites and the process of accommodation depend 
highly on the established structures and institutions of interest accommodation. 
Especially France and Canada, with their totally different models of political 
organization, might clarify the significance of political structures and institutions for the 
evolution of nationalist movements. The federal Canadian system, which is based on the 
concept of different cultures being integrated into one political system, provides many 
forms and places for political participation. In opposition to this model, the unitary and 
highly centralized French model ignores the existence of cultural and ethnic minorities, 
and is based on the ideology of the one and indivisible French republic. This model is 
relatively closed to the articulation of newly formed political, social and economic 
interests. Such an approach allows us to distinguish clearly between the confining 
institutional, socio-economic and cultural conditions that constitutes the room for 
political action on the one side, and those factors on the other side that trace back to the 
motivations and decisions of political actors within this room. Tarrow’s concept of 
political opportunity-structure, which has be refined by Rokkan and Urwin, might also be 
a helpful instrument to gauge the involved groups potentials for political action and the 
respective limits on their potentials.16  Tarrow is focused on three factors: the openness or 
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closeness of the political system for the articulation of new and alternative political 
interests, the stability of the electorate and the disposability of political partners in the 
system. The factors can by investigated by an analysis of the established forms of 
regional interest integration into the national system.   
  
Traditional Patterns of Elite Accommodation 
 
 If we follow Paul Brass in explaining the formation of ethno-territorial protest 
movements as, at least in part, a result of elite interaction, we have to explain why a 
nationalist uprising in Corsica or Québec did not follow the interaction of the elites prior 
to the 1960s. Were there comparable structures of elite accommodation in France and 
Canada that guaranteed stability over such a long period? In both cases we can clearly 
speak of a stable political structure that had been based on the established systems of elite 
accommodation in each country. But the two models of elite accommodation show 
different institutional characteristics. In Corsica we can speak of an informal system of 
elite accommodation that provides new political actors just few opportunities for 
participation. Besides the highly centralized center-periphery structure in France that is 
built on the system of prefects at the departmental and local level, there are influential 
local elites that were able to effectively secure their integration at the beginning of the 
state-building process in France. Because of language problems and different cultural 
traditions in the regions that had to be integrated into the French state, national elites 
needed help from locally influential elites to pursue the politics of nation- and state-
building in France. These local elites - named notables in France generally or clans in 
Corsica - attained a position as nation-building-helpers in the center-periphery structure 
and were thus able to maintain their local power position despite the centralizing 
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tendency of the French state and integrated well into the newly formed center-periphery 
structure in France.17 Jack Hayward explains:  
  
Without such concessions to the countervailing power of the local  
communities, the strict interpretation of the rules would shatter the semblance  
of national unity which is the shibboleth on which state authority is based.18   
 
The notables were able to enlarge their power position in the local community, because 
the political elites of the central state needed their cooperation to fulfill the process of 
nation building. This pouvoir périphérique19 and the institutional centralism are the 
essential elements of a reciprocal system of cooperation that overruled the vertical 
construction of the established institutions. Local elites and the representatives of the 
central state operated in a framework of a more informal decision structure. A parallel 
and relatively autonomous decision making process was a consequence of this 
constellation of political actors.   
   
Though the relatively rigid center-periphery-structure included local notables and 
the prefects as key figures in the system of local government, and the informal channels 
of communication between the different levels of government assured the integration of 
regional interests in Paris, this arrangement made the articulation of alternative political 
interests difficult. As long as the notables were able to stabilize their positions, this 
system of elite accommodation guaranteed a stable center-periphery-structure between 
Corsica and Paris.   
  
 In comparison, the system of accommodation in Québec bears a higher degree of 
institutionalization than the case of Corsica. This implies that there is more room for 
political action on the sub-national level, and that political actors have a lot of resources 
  Lammert, Ethno-territorial Accommodation 
 
for political decisions. This center-periphery structure has therefore been more open for 
new political actors, at least if we compare it with the Corsican case. The system of elite 
accommodation in Corsica is characterized by the cooperation of the notables with the 
French state in which and the notables try to prohibit the formulation of alternative 
political interests. The system of accommodation in Québec on the other hand is based on 
the principle of non-interference, i.e. the political powers are strictly separated between 
the different levels of government, the provincial and the national. This arrangement in 
Québec is the result of a historical evolution that started long before the formation of the 
Canadian federation in 1867.20   
  
  As a result of the process of socio-economic modernization, both systems of elite 
accommodation came under pressure after the Second World War. The processes of 
modernization, both in the socio-economic and in the political dimension, affected the 
established systems of elite accommodation in Québec and Corsica in different ways. The 
system of elite accommodation in Corsica proved to be highly adaptable to the process of 
modernization and helped to soften the impact of this process on the Corsican population. 
Developments in Québec took a different path. The process of modernization had a 
serious impact on the political system and the established institutions and actors.  
Traditional elites in Québec, the clergy and the traditional nationalists, organized in the 
Union Nationale of Duplessis, were not able to adapt to the new socio-economic situation 
and new forces, classes and actors assumed their position in the Québecois society. This 
process is known as the Quiet Revolution.   
  
  Traditional local elites in Corsica benefited from the process of modernization and 
were able to stabilize their position in the Corsican society. These divergences are to a 
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large degree the result of the different systems of elite accommodation in the both cases. 
The center-periphery structure in Corsica—based on informal but rigid channels between 
the local and the national system-- assured local elites, i.e. the notables, access to the 
necessary resources—jobs in the administration and public money—to consolidate their 
pivotal position between the local society and the French state. Furthermore, they were 
able to strengthen their position, both because of their adaptability to the new 
circumstances, and because the center- periphery structure was closed to the formation of 
new political interests, articulated by the so-called new middle classes. Traditional elites 
in Québec, on the other hand, were incapable of readjusting to the new realties of the 
modern welfare state that was built in Canada after the Second World War. The patterns 
of the relationship between the different levels of government in Canada that granted 
local political actors a great degree of freedom in articulating their interests on the sub-
national level allowed the integration of the new economic and political interests of the 
new middle class into the institutions and the system of interest representation of the 
political system. Additionally Corsica missed the formation of a relevant political counter 
elite and the building of a strong working class like Québec that could have imperiled the 
strong position of the notables.  
   
Analyzing the formation of nationalist movements in this way, as I have 
mentioned before, is very close to the approach of Paul Brass. Brass defines elite-
concurrence as the main factor in the conversion of cultural differences into a basis of 
political difference. Naturally some conditions have to be met, but these conditions are 
primarily political or economic in character rather than cultural. In this perspective, 
ethnic identity or shared cultural or ethnic backgrounds are seen as flexible resources in 
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the political statement of diverse political interests on the sub-national as well as on the 
national level. The analyzed cases, Corsica and Québec, clearly indicate how different 
political actors on the sub-national level compete with the same concepts of ethnic 
identity for the electorate. Cultural values and practices become political assets in the 
quarrel for political power and economic advantages.   
  
New Models of Elite Accommodation in France and Canada  
  
  The process of socio-economic modernization, particularly after World War Two, 
had different effects on the respective established traditional systems of elite 
accommodation, as was shown above. The new social forces, coming first of all from the 
recently formed new middle classes that formed the basis for the nationalistic interest 
articulation during the 1960s, were confronted with different institutional and structural 
conditions in Corsica and Québec that considerably influenced their further development. 
In the following, I will discuss the evolution of the both movements and work out the 
conditions for the deviating paths of evolution they took by using Brass’ concept of elite 
concurrence.      
  
I will proceed by discussing Corsican nationalist movement first, proposing the 
following classification of the three step-development: The first phase, which I will refer 
to as the phase of economic regionalism, lasts from 1957 to 1970. The second phase, 
from 1970 to 1975, will be labeled autonomistic regionalism and the last and third, from 
1975 to present, may be termed nationalistic regionalism.  In general, two questions or 
sets of questions will guide my analysis: First, what causes the protest, and second, how 
can we explain its progressive radicalization? As a preview of the core argument, the 
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three main propositions are as follows. First, the formation of the nationalist movement in 
Corsica is closely linked to French regional planning policies in the Post-Second World 
War era. Second, the movement that formed in this period must be clearly distinguished 
from older nationalistic movements in Corsica. Third, the radicalization of the movement 
can be explained mainly be the rejection of the French government to cooperate with 
moderate forces in Corsica.  
  
The first protest groups in Corsica were organized in the late 1950s as a direct 
response to the regional action program of the French government initiated in 1957. The 
program's goal was to alleviate the consequences of socio-economic modernization in 
Corsica. The main group was named Centre d`études régionales Corse. It was a primarily 
economically oriented group and its leadership followed a cooperative strategy towards 
the French government that was designed to help the French government in the 
implementation of the regional action program.21 This type of groups still constitutes one 
major strand of the nationalist movement.  
                                                           
At nearly the same time, Corsican students on the French mainland began to 
organize in student groups (Union Corse, Union national d`éstudiante corse), the core 
organizations of the second strand of Corsican nationalism. These groups were strongly 
influenced by socialist ideologies and the process of decolonization.22 In 1966 the biggest 
two student organizations combined into the Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC). From the 
perspective of this more radical and culturally oriented strand of the nascent nationalist 
movement the situation of Corsica was interpreted as a part of the general decolonization 
process.  
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 In the mid 1960s the so called forces vives in Corsica - vendors and petty 
bourgeois were organizing the Comité d`études et de defense des interets de la Corse 
(CEDIC).23 As in the case of the aforementioned Corsican Center for Regional Studies, 
the CEDIC represents the cooperative strand, whose primary function is to articulate 
economic interests. 1967 the FRC and the CEDIC merged into the Action Régionaliste 
Corse (ARC). But because of different interpretations of the causes of the Corsican 
problems the movement split only one year later into ARC and FRC. Here the ARC 
represents the moderate wing with, again, a primarily economic outlook. In the 1970s, 
though, the moderates added a new element to their program: the concept of autonomy. 
The concept of internal autonomy had already been discussed in the 1960s, but had not 
been a key element of the movement in explaining the political priorities of economic 
modernization and the displacement of the indigenous Corsican economy as an objective 
and consequence of the French politics of decolonialization.24   
  
  With the adoption of 'internal autonomy' as a key political demand, the second 
phase of the evolution of the ethno-territorial movement begins: Corsican autonomism. In 
spite of generally rising tensions, different degrees of radicalization still characterized the 
various parts of the movement at this stage, with the radical and socialistic strand 
represented in the FRC and a moderate and pragmatic strand represented by the ARC. 
But a second regional action plan proposed by the French government clearly 
strengthened the radical wing. The new plan followed a narrow logic of economic 
efficiency and envisioned an enlargement of the tourism and agricultural sector on the 
island. Critical reports predicted a one-sided and, in the long run, catastrophic 
development of the Corsican economy as the likely consequence of the regional plan's 
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implementation. The French governments indifference towards Corsica's main economic 
problems seemed to validate the radical view and helped to further the radicalization of 
nationalist rhetoric as well as group activities.   
  
In the mid 1970s the French government began to react to the ethno-territorial 
movement in Corsica by banning the ARC.  The event that provoked the French 
government’s drastic reaction was the so-called Aleria affair. In 1975 the ARC seized a 
vineyard in Aleria to protest against a wine scandal. The French state interpreted this 
public relations stunt as an immediate threat to French national unity and ended the 
occupation with massive military and police forces. The ban of the ARC and the 
generally more repressive posture of the French government lead to a further 
radicalization, and drove parts of the movement underground.  
   
From this perspective the Aleria affair can be seen as a turning point that 
demarcates the beginning of the third and final stage in the Corsican movement's 
development: the phase of separatism. To name just two of the more prominent 
organizations of the nationalist movement after 1975: The Fronte de la Liberation 
Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) is an example of an illegal group, later breaking up into 
several new groups, among them the canal historique and the canal habituell. The 
successor of the forbidden ARC, the Union di u Populu Corsu (UPC), presents an 
example of a legal group, working within the Corsican political system and regularly 
winning about 8 to 10 percent of the popular vote in regional elections.25  
 
Whether analyzing the general trend or individual incidents, the historical sketch 
of the conflict between the nationalist movement and the French government since the 
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late 1950s suggests a clearly defined pattern of continuous escalation. First the French 
government ignores the grievances and demands articulated by the Corsican movement, 
and then reacts to the resulting radicalization in a way that deepens the rift between the 
government and the groups. Viewed from a slightly different angle, this spiral of 
escalation, based on the particular mode of interaction between the two sides, drives and 
explains the progressive radicalization in Corsica.  
  
While the strategy and policy on the part of the French government are a vital 
factor, two other aspects need to be taken into consideration.  Both work to limit the 
ability of the Corsican movement to mobilize support: on the one hand the peculiarities of 
the Corsican political system, on the other the French socialist party’s reform program.   
  
With respect to the power structure of Mediterranean island, the clan system is a 
key element whose importance can hardly be overstated. For generations a few families 
have controlled the island. The French state has become dependent on this local elite, 
bringing it into the role of a mediator or a broker between the state and the Corsican 
community. The clan system has proved to be extremely adaptive in the process of socio-
economic modernization and political reforms implemented as part of the French policies 
of decentralization and regionalization. The devolution French-style has stabilized the 
power position of the clans and prevented the new forces-vives from fully participating in 
the political process.  
  
Secondly, the socialist policy of decentralization brought Corsica a statute 
particulier (1982) with special rights and powers. The reform has sharply curtailed the 
political potential for nationalist mobilization on the island. The statute particulier offers 
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the Mediterranean island special treatment well beyond the concessions associated with 
the politics of decentralization. For example, Corsica is the first French region that has 
been reorganized as a regional corporation, not merely an administrative unit, but a 
political entity with certain independent functions and powers. The electoral system has 
been reorganized to strengthen the smaller parties. The regional council of Corsica has 
been renamed 'National Assembly' and, going further than institutional reforms in other 
French regions, a council for culture, education and quality of life has been instituted.   
  
 Measured against its objectives, the statute particulier has failed. One reason was 
that it was not implemented in a dialogue with Corsican political elites. Thus autonomists 
as well as separatists rejected it. The clans also rejected the proposed reforms, but have 
been able to take advantage of the reform, again strengthening their power position. As a 
consequence, the intended integration of the ethno-territorial protest movement, or at 
least major parts of it, has not been achieved. As with earlier reform programs, the statute 
particulier fell short of the expectations of the nationalist movement. In the following 
decade the French socialists gave up on the policy of dialogue with the movement, 
returning to a tougher, less cooperative approach.  
  
Since the mid 1980s the pattern of interaction between the French state and the 
Corsican movement has remained unchanged. The situation has been complicated 
considerably by the underground groups' cooperation with organized crime. This 
cooperation is rejected by a vast majority of the Corsican population and has discredited 
the whole national movement.  
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Whereas newly formed groups first articulated regional protest in Corsica, protest 
in Quebec found expression within the established political system from the outset, the 
main and most important agent being the Parti Liberal du Québec (PLQ).26  Thus 1960, 
the year the PLQ took power from the Union Nationale, seems to be the obvious date to 
set as the beginning of the evolution of the modern nationalist movement in Quebec. 
1960 is also a year discussed in the literature as the starting point of the Quiet Revolution. 
The programmatic transformation of the PLQ comes into sharper focus when viewed 
against the background of its traditional anti-nationalistic outlook. Until the 1950s the 
PLQ had been nothing more than a regional chapter of Liberal Party of Canada. The PLQ 
had been concerned mostly with policies on the federal level and the party had tried to 
articulate francophone interests as a part of this strategy. But tensions rose between the 
growing party bureaucracies at the provincial and the federal level. In combination with 
the increasing importance of provincial institutions resulting from the  build-up of the 
Canadian welfare state, these tensions lead to a growing independence of the Liberal 
Party chapter in Quebec.27 The process of socio-economic modernization in Canada also 
resulted in a fragmentation of the political system and the party system, primarily 
between the federal and provincial level. The centrifugal tendencies were particularly 
strong in the case of the francophone province that enjoyed a special status guaranteed by 
the Québec Act of 1774. Until the 1960s the established model of elite accommodation 
between the federal state and the francophone province had worked well. But this system 
of power sharing in Quebec was not adequate to the need of the modern welfare state. A 
new middle class found its way into the PLQ, using it as the main vehicle for its 
integration into the political system.28  
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  The growing significance of provincial institutions and their power in the 
Canadian federation lead to rising tensions in the PLQ. As a consequence René Lévesque 
left the party in 1968 and founded the Movement Association Souverainité and, later, the 
Parti Québécois (PQ). The PQ gained 23.1 percent of the votes in the election of 1971, 
won the provincial election of 1976, and was thus able to establish itself as a relevant 
actor.  
 
Since the 1970s, the PQ has been a constant and strong factor in provincial and 
national politics.29 In the early phase we can distinguish two wings of the PQ: a radical 
wing that opted for immediate separation of the province from Canada, and a moderate 
wing that demanded a referendum on the question of separation to be held before 
deciding on the future of the province. The latter gained control over the party and the 
election of 1976 was won with other issues than separation.  Until the 1980s the concept 
of separation did not figure prominently in the program of the PQ. It is hard to take the 
first referendum in 1980 as a clear indicator for wider support for independence. The 
referendum question was phrased in a way that implied no real independence from the 
Canadian federation, but a complex arrangement of sovereignty association: a kind of 
part-time separation, with many responsibilities left to be shared with the Canadian 
federation.30 A closer look at public opinion surveys indicates no support for separation 
beyond the proposed 'soft solution'. A clear-cut secession from the Canadian federation 
was rejected by most of Quebec's voters.31 Thus after the failure of the referendum in 
1980 the question of separation was pushed off the PQ's political agenda. Only under the 
new leadership of Jacques Parizeau, in 1989, did the PQ reorient its programmatic course 
towards separation. Interestingly, this move was not followed by an increased support 
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among voters. In the mid-1990s separation was again on the agenda of Quebec politics. 
In the second referendum on separation in 1995 a razor-thin majority of 50.5 percent 
voted against separation. But as in the referendum 1980, the watered-down wording of 
the referendum question makes it hard to speak of a referendum on separation. In case of 
adoption, the referendum would have given the Quebec government nothing more but a 
mandate to negotiate a reform of the Canadian federation with the federal government. 
The legal process of separation was in no way discussed.32   
  
  Thus the presence and strength of the PQ in the provincial political system cannot 
be taken as an indicator of the support for independence in Quebec. The party has 
presented itself as a political alternative to separation. With a partly social democratic and 
partly conservative program the PQ has tried to distinguish itself from the PLQ. So how 
can we measure support for independence in Quebec in other ways than by using PQ vote 
shares? A look at voter surveys can help us in this regard. On the basis of survey data we 
can identify waves of nationalistic mobilization in Quebec: an increase toward the end of 
the 1970s, peaking at the time of the referendum in 1980. After the repatriation of the 
Canadian constitution in 1982 a decline until the early 1990s, then again an increase 
leading up to the second referendum in 1995. Since the second referendum the support 
for independence has fallen off again.33   
  
Conclusion 
 
To sum up the argument, the consequences of the process of socio-economic 
modernization vary in accordance to the character of the established system of elite 
accommodation. The differing dynamics of evolution of the nationalist movements in 
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Corsica and Québec is mainly a result of the position of the nationalist movement in the 
political system. This is conditioned by the established political institutions and the 
framework for political action for the relevant actors that follows from them. The relevant 
actors are the agents of the nationalist movement themselves, as well as the competing 
political elites on the sub-national level and the state as representative of the subordinated 
political power. In both cases, Corsica and Québec, there is an immanent radicalization of 
the ethno-territorial protest movement that can be seen in different phases of 
development. At the beginning of this evolution the protest articulation of the movement 
is primarily motivated by economic aspects and concerned with the outcome of the 
process of socio-economic modernization on the sub-national level. In a second step, the 
focus is complemented by a cultural interpretation of the economic malaise. Concepts of 
autonomy increasingly gain the attention of the leaders of the nationalist movement. In a 
last step of radicalization the antagonism between the movement and the state becomes 
greater and some parts of the movement propose to separate from the existing political 
system and form a new state.   
  
  This radicalization is mainly the result of the interaction between the movement 
and the state. In a first step the state ignores the demands of the ethno-territorial protest 
movements. This is followed by a radicalization of the nationalist movement with respect 
to their goals and their approaches. This in turn is followed by concessions of the state 
authorities that however lags far behind the new demands of the movement. This 
interaction-escalation spiral can be seen in the French discussion about the politics of 
decentralization and regionalization as well as in the Canadian constitutional discussion. 
But the outcome of this spiral differs significantly in regard to the organization of the 
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nationalist movement between Corsica and Québec. The nationalist movement in Québec 
was able to integrate into the political system in the form of the Parti Québecois, whereas 
the integration of the nationalist movement succeeded only partly and some parts of the 
movement are fighting outside the legal bounds of the constitution for an independent 
Corsica.   
  
 As we show above, this is primarily a result of the different systems of interest 
integration and different types of center-periphery structures in both countries. The rigid 
structure in France that functions in the Corsican case, with the clans as mediators 
between the island society and the state, proved to be adaptable to the process of 
modernization following the Second World War. The Corsican protest movement that 
later on built the base of the nationalist movement was not integrated into the political 
system and had to look for other ways of interest articulation. The socialist regional 
reforms of the 1980s guaranteed a more successful integration of the nationalistic forces, 
but the radicalization of the movement had already happened in the 1970s as a result of 
the clan dominance and the established models of elite accommodation on the island. 
Furthermore the fragmentation of the nationalist movement in the 1970s weakened the 
legal strands of the movement. Violence and organized crime have de-legitimized the 
ethno-territorial movement in the Corsican society. Beyond this the strong French state 
and the strong French ideology of ‘the one and indivisible republic‘ have further 
weakened nationalism in Corsica.   
  
  The specific patterns of the center periphery structure between Corsica and the 
French state assure autonomous political spheres for the local elites in Corsica, but these 
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spheres have never been organized in democratic institutionalized structures. This would 
have been contrary to the interest of the notables, as the informal system of elite 
accommodation stabilized their position and fenced off alternative political forces.   
  
 The situation in Québec presents a different picture. The new political forces that were 
organized in the process of socio-economic modernization were able to integrate 
themselves into the political system of the mainly francophone province Québec. This is 
partly because of the openness of Canadian federalism and the substantial degree of 
autonomy that allows regional and local actors to play an important role in the decision 
making process. In particular, the distinct situation of the province of Québec has to be 
mentioned here. The historically contingent, asymmetrical structures and elements of 
Canadian federalism left enough room for the nationalists in competing for votes and 
power.  
  
To conclude, it seems clear now that support for and the success of nationalist 
arguments and movements is to a great extent the product of the political system itself. 
We can observe this mechanism also in the Western Canadian provinces, where a sub-
national identity has been built without common cultural or ethnic tradition. It is 
obviously clear that this mechanism applies especially to the movement in Québec that is 
based on a set of common cultural norms and traditions and institutionalized rights on 
distinctiveness. The governing elites on the sub national level are influencing the 
evolution of the national movements with their political decisions and policy instruments. 
These policies do not have to be based on cultural or ethnic traditions to have this impact 
on the evolution of the national movement.34  In a federal system like Canada, the 
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influence of these factors is bigger than in a centralized system like France, because the 
framework for political action is wider and more institutionalized on the sub-national 
level. In France, the center-periphery structure is primarily based on an informal system 
of interest accommodation. The provincial political elites in Canada want to protect the 
longstanding interests of their society and economy; they also they have a vested interest 
in provincial status and power which the several provincial electorates do not share 
fully,35 which means an interest in maintaining political and administrative power 
themselves. These interests exist on the national level as well. The provincial as well as 
the national governments are not neutral contenders or reflecting mirrors, but aggressive 
actors steadily extending their tentacles of control, regulation, and manipulation into 
society—playing, in Deutsch‘s ‘terminology, a steering role—and thus fostering sets of 
integrated relationships between themselves and the various socio-economic forces and 
interests in their jurisdiction.36  
      
Alain Cairn‘s argument is very similar to the argument outlined in the work of 
Paul Brass. Following Brass, ethnic identity originates from the specific interaction 
between the elites of the central state and the elites of non-dominant ethnic groups.37 It is 
not just the existence of cultural differences that is important, but the way in which these 
differences are converted into a basis for political differentiation. The central state 
response to the regional protest articulation plays an important role in shaping the 
problem. The established institutional framework and the process of interaction in-
between this framework determines the evolution of nationalist movements more than 
cultural factors.  
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